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CIVIL PROCEDURE-Necessity of the Personal Representative Status
in Wrongful Death Actions: Fact or Fiction?: Chavez v. Regents of the
University of New Mexico

I. INTRODUCTION

In Chavez v. Regents of the Universityof New Mexico,' the New Mexico

Supreme Court held that if a wrongful death action is filed by a person
other than the personal representative within the statute of limitations,
the failure to appoint a personal representative prior to the running of the

limitations period does not bar the suit. 2 Relying on the New Mexico
Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c) and 17(a), 3 the court found that an amendment alleging that plaintiff now had the capacity to sue related back to
the time of filing the original complaint and that, under the circumstances
presented in the case, plaintiffs' joinder of the personal representative
was accomplished within a reasonable time. 4 In overruling the court of
appeals decision in Mackey v. Burke,5 the Chavez court brought the state
in line with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States. This Note
analyzes the Chavez court's reasoning in light of Rules 15(c) and 17(a)
of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure, and considers the wisdom
of the rule that requires wrongful death actions to be prosecuted by

personal representatives.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 19, 1980, Sandra Chavez, a seventeen year old girl,
died in the University of New Mexico Hospital. 6 On September 14, 1982,
Antonio and Cipriana Chavez brought suit under the New Mexico Tort
Claims Act7 against the Regents of the University of New Mexico, alleging
I. 103 N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883 (1985).
2. Id. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
3. N.M. STAT. ANN. R. Civ. P. 15(c) and 17(a) (Repl. Pamp. 1980).
4. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 612, 711 P.2d at 889.
5. 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 293, 694 P.2d 1358
(1985).
6. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
7. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-4-1 to -27 (Repl. Pamp. 1982 and Cum. Supp. 1985). Because the
Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy against a public employee, the two year statute of
limitations of the act governs the wrongful death action. See Regents of the University of New
Mexico v. Armijo, 103 N.M. 174, 704 P.2d 428 (1985); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 646
P.2d 1245 (Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the specific inclusion of a wrongful death claim within a
malpractice claim makes the limitation period of the Medical Malpractice Act applicable due to the
fact that a specific inclusion controls over the general limitation period for wrongful death).
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medical malpractice and the wrongful death of their daughter.' The plaintiffs asserted their capacity to sue as "the parents and surviving heirs and
9
representatives of Sandra Diane Chavez, an unmarried minor." The
defendants answered the complaint on September 29, 1982, without rais°
ing an affirmative defense of lack of capacity to sue.' On June 8, 1983,
after the two year statute of limitations applicable under the Tort Claims
Act had expired, Plaintiff Cipriana Chavez was appointed personal representative, a statutory requirement for bringing a wrongful death action
in New Mexico." On November 28, 1984, after two years of discovery
and motions on the merits, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment based on plaintiffs' failure to
obtain court-appointment of a personal representative within the statute
of limitations period.' 2 The trial court denied defendants' motion, but
3
certified the issue for interlocutory appeal. 1 Relying on its previous de4 the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed
cision in Mackey v. Burke,
the trial court on the ground that the wrongful death action was barred
8. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
9. Id. The plaintiffs sought damages for the loss of their daughter's society, comfort, support,
counsel and services, for medical and funeral expenses, and for attorney fees.
10. Id. The legal capacity to sue is defined as an individual's "right to come into court." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 803 (5th ed. 1979). Capacity is defined as a party's personal right to come into
court, regardless of whether the party has an enforceable right or interest or is the real party in

interest. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1559 (1971). See also

Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Services Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D.C. Md. 1975). Capacity
is a procedural issue that deals with personal qualifications of a party to litigate. 6 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1559.

I1.N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1982 and Cum. Supp. 1985). Section 41-2-3 provides:
Every such [wrongful death] action ...shall be brought by and in the name
or names of the personal representative or representatives of such deceased person ...
The proceeds of any judgment obtained in any such action shall not be liable for
any debt of the deceased: provided, he or she shall have left a husband, wife,
child, father, mother, brother, sister or child or children of the deceased child,
but shall be distributed as follows:
First. If there be a surviving husband or wife, and no child, then to such
husband or wife; if there be a surviving husband or wife and a child or children
or grandchildren, then equally to each, the grandchild or grandchildren taking by
right of representation; if there be no husband or wife, but a child or children,
or grandchild or grandchildren, then to such child or children and grandchild or
grandchildren, by right of representation; if such deceased be a minor, childless
and unmarried, then to the father and mother, who shall have an equal interest
in the judgment, or if either of them be dead, then to the survivor ...
(emphasis added).
12. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
13. Id.
14. 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359 (Ct. App. 1984), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 293, 694 P.2d
1358 (1985). Mackey stood for the proposition that plaintiffs who sued individually and as the natural
parents of the deceased were barred from bringing a wrongful death action under the Medical
Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-5-1 to -28 (Repl. Pamp. 1982), as a result of their failure
to name a personal representative within the limitation period.
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by the failure of a duly appointed personal representative to sue within
the limitations period. 5
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
court of appeals. 6 According to the Supreme Court, plaintiffs' failure to
secure court-appointment of a personal representative within the limitations period did not bar the action timely filed by the natural parents of
the deceased. "7In addition, the court overruled any prior case law to the
extent that it conflicted with the Chavez decision.' 8
1II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
At common law, no cause of action existed for wrongful death.' 9
Wrongful death actions are thus purely statutory creations and can only
be brought as the authorizing statutes permit.2" The New Mexico wrongful
death act requires that such a suit be brought "by and in the name or
names of the personal representative or representatives of such deceased
person. '"21 The term "personal representative" is used to identify the
agency, the trustee, or the person who is permitted to prosecute this
particular kind of action.22 The New Mexico Wrongful Death Act,23 like
wrongful death statutes in other jurisdictions, considers the personal representative a nominal party, having no interest in the case for himself or
the estate he represents. 24 Under this view, the personal representative
does not act in his capacity as executor, administrator, or representative
15. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 607-08, 711 P.2d at 884-85 (citing to the memorandum opinion of the
Court of Appeals).
16. Id. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 608, 711 P.2d at 885. Thus, the Chavez court effectively overruled the Mackey decision,
102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359. Unfortunately, the plaintiffs in Mackey had settled with their insurance
company before the Chavez decision was rendered so that they were left without recourse to challenge
the Court of Appeals' decision in their case.
19. Ickes v. Brimhall, 42 N.M. 412, 79 P.2d 942 (1938).
20. See, e.g., Torres v. Sierra, 89 N.M. 441, 553 P.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1976); Perry v. Staver,
81 N.M. 766, 473 P.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1970). The purpose of the wrongful death statute is to promote
safety of life and limb by making negligence that causes death costly to the wrongdoer. Gutierrez
v. Kent Nowlin Constr., Co., 99 N.M. 394, 400, 658 P.2d 1121, 1127 (Ct. App. 1981).
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-2-3 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
22. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 81 N.M. 348, 350, 467 P.2d 14, 16 (1970); Henkel v. Hood, 49
N.M. 45, 47, 156 P.2d 790, 792 (1945). Other wrongful death statutes designate other persons,
such as administrators and executors as the proper parties to bring suit. See, e.g., Deupree v. Levinson,
186 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 915 (1950); Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d
844 (Fla. 1954).
23. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
24. See, e.g., McDavid v. Fiscar, 342 Ill. App. 673, 97 N.E.2d 587 (1951) (Neither the administrator nor the estate of the decedent has any interest in, or right to, any judgment that may be
recovered in a wrongful death action; the real party in interest is the next of kin, as beneficiary);
Re Estate of Ives, 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 807 (1958) (In a wrongful death action, the real party
in interest is the beneficiary under the statute, not the administrator).
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of the decedent's estate, but sues as a trustee on behalf of the particular
persons designated in the act.25 Thus, the next of kin are, in essence, the
"real parties in interest" because they share the recovery, even though
26
they are not necessary parties to the action according to the statute.
Judgment proceeds never become an asset of the community or of the
decedent's estate.27 Instead, the proceeds belong to the discoverable and
identifiable beneficiaries named in the wrongful death statute.28
Although the Wrongful Death Act specifically mandates an action's
commencement by a personal representative, New Mexico decisions prior
to Chavez diminished the significance of the statutory requirement. The
court in Henkel v. Hood9 set the standard for interpreting the personal
30
representative clause in the Wrongful Death Act. The court indicated
that it is merely incidental that a personal representative is required to
bring a suit for wrongful death. 3 It held that a Texas administrator with
limited powers could maintain the suit as a personal representative, even
though the administrator was not technically qualified to act in New
Mexico.32 Most importantly, the Henkel decision stands for the proposition
that wrongful death actions should not fail because of the absence of a
party technically capable of suing.33
Like Henkel, subsequent New Mexico case law has broadly construed
34
the statutory mandate of the personal representative requirement. One
3" Another
court even called personal representatives "nominal" parties.
court,36 applying the definitional scope of the Henkel court's decision,
25. See 22 AM.JuR.2D Death § 198 (1965 and Cum. Supp. 1986).
26. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 2D § 11:28 (1975).
27. See Varney v. Taylor, 77 N.M. 28, 419 P.2d 234 (1966); Baca v. Baca, 71 N.M. 468, 379
P.2d 765 (1963); Trefzer v. Stiles, 56 N.M. 296, 243 P.2d 605 (1952). See supra note II.
28. Dominguez v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 605, 673 P.2d 1338 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 100
N.M. 689, 675 P.2d 421 (1983); Varney, 77 N.M. at 34, 419 P.2d at 238-39; Kilkenny v. Kenney,
68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149 (1961).
29. 49 N.M. 45, 156 P.2d 790 (1945).
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§41-2-1 to -4 (Repl. Pamp. 1982).
31. Henkel, 49 N.M. at 47, 156 P.2d at 791. The Henkel court indicated that the personal
representative is simply the individual named by the Legislature to bring suit. It is unnecessary for
an administrator to have full powers over an estate to sue in New Mexico for wrongful death on
behalf of the statutory beneficiaries.
32. Id. The Henkel court reached this conclusion by defining the scope of the personal representative as expanding to include temporary, special, and ancillary administrators, because the duties
of such an administrator were not important to determine an administrator's capacity to sue for
wrongful death. An ancillary administration is auxiliary and subordinate to the administration at the
place of the decedent's domicile and is established merely for the purpose of collecting assets and
paying debts in a foreign state or country. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (5th ed. 1979). A special
administration, on the other hand, is the authority to administer upon a few effects of a decedent,
rather than his whole estate. Id. at 42.
33. 49 N.M. at 47, 156 P.2d at 791.
34. See Torres, 89 N.M. at 444, 553 P.2d at 724. See also Chavez, 103 N.M. at 608, 711 P.2d
at 885.
35. Dominguez v. Rogers, 100 N.M. 605, 608, 673 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Ct. App. 1983).
36. Torres, 89 N.M. at 444, 553 P.2d at 724.
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found that a Mexican national, an alien in the United States, could bring
the wrongful death action as the administrator of his son's estate, since
an administrator falls within the category of personal representative. 37 In
sum, the New Mexico case law concerning wrongful death actions tends
to favor a liberal interpretation of representative capacity.
A recent New Mexico case, however, adopted a novel approach when
considering the question of representative capacity. Mackey v. Burke,3" a
case decided by the New Mexico Court of Appeals only eighteen months
before the Supreme Court decided Chavez, involved a situation similar
to that in Chavez. In Mackey, plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action
individually and as the parents of their deceased daughter.39 After the
statute of limitations had run, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to
add the decedent's father as personal representative. 4 The trial court
entered summary judgment for the defendants. 4 ' On plaintiff's appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.42 The Mackey court reasoned
that the personal representative requirement was jurisdictional and that a
failure to meet the statutory requirement would render the suit a "nullity."43 Because the court interpreted the original complaint as being void,
an amendment adding a party as a personal representative could not relate
back to the original filing of the complaint so as to avoid the running of
the statute of limitations.'
The Mackey decision followed the minority view on the subject.45
According to this view, the individual has no standing to sue in the courts
until attaining a personal representative status, and an amendment made
after the right of action has expired cannot validate the unauthorized filing
of the suit.4' Furthermore, the decision in Mackey interpreted the Henkel
court's decision as requiring, as a jurisdictional prerequisite, the courtappointment of a personal representative before filing a wrongful death
action.4 7 Emphasizing the representative capacity of the plaintiff, the
Mackey court concluded that if the personal representative requirement
37. Id.
38. 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359.
39. Id. at 295, 694 P.2d at 1360.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 299, 694 P.2d at 1364. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied certiorari. 102 N.M.
293, 694 P.2d 1358 (1985).
43. Mackey, 102 N.M. at299, 694 P.2d at1364.
44. Id. at298-99, 694 P.2d at1363-64.
45. See, e.g., Mann v.Moss, 323 F.Supp. 1126 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (refusal
tofile
with the court
an authenticated copy of the foreign fiduciary's appointment atthe time the wrongful death action
was brought or within the two year statute of limitations was a fatal defect not curable by amendment);
General Motors Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (the plaintiff's belated
appointment as personal representative did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint).
46. Davis v. Meridian & Bigbee R. Co., 248 Miss. 707, 161 So.2d 171 (1964).
47. 102 N.M. at 297, 694 P.2d at 1362. In contrast, the Henkel court indicated that personal
representatives were merely statutory designations.
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was not met within the statute of limitations, the suit was a "nullity,"
due to the inability of the plaintiffs to assert the right sought to be enforced
in the action." Since plaintiffs initially lacked the right to enforce the
action, the court concluded that plaintiffs' reliance on Rule 15(c) was
misplaced. 49 The Mackey court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the logic
inherent in the Rules of Civil Procedure and the permissiveness usually
given to amendments of pleadings should apply to allow plaintiffs' amended
complaint to relate back to the date of initial filing.5" The alternative
would have allowed plaintiffs' amendment to relate back, a view adopted
by most courts that favor amendments over forfeitures of causes of action,
especially where no prejudice would result to the defendant. 5
IV. DISCUSSION
A. New Mexico Supreme Court's Decision in Chavez
In New Mexico, the failure of a plaintiff in a wrongful death action to
obtain court-appointment of a personal representative before the running
of the statute of limitations will not bar the maintenance of the suit if a
subsequent court-appointment is obtained and the personal representative
is made a party within a reasonable time.52 Realizing that wrongful death
actions allow personal injury claims to survive the death of the injured
person, 53 the New Mexico Supreme Court in Chavez noted that the statutory requirement of bringing the suit by a personal representative was
a mere formality."4 That view is consistent with the trend of the case law
in New Mexico, which indicates that it is incidental that a personal
representative is authorized to bring a wrongful death action55 and that
the personal representative is only a nominal party.56 One of the guiding
principles behind the court's interpretation is that the Wrongful Death
Act should be liberally construed57 and that the action should not fail
Id. at 299, 694 P.2d at 1364.
Id.
Mackey, 102 N.M. at 297-98, 694 P.2d at 1362-63.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, at § 1555.
Chavez, 103 N.M. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another. . . and the act, or neglect, or default, is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and
recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who,
or the corporation which, would have been liable, if death had not ensued, shall
be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
The significance of this section lies in the fact that if the injured party had lived, he would have
been able to bring an action against the wrongdoer for personal injuries. See, e.g., Whitmer v. El
Paso & S.W. Co., 201 F. 193 (5th Cir. 1912).
54. 103 N.M. at 608, 711 P.2d at 885.
55. Henkel, 49 N.M. at 47, 156 P.2d at 791.
56. Dominguez, 100 N.M. at 608, 673 P.2d at 1341.
57. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 609, 711 P.2d at 886.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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simply because the plaintiffs, who were the natural parties to sue, lacked
the capacity to sue until after the statute of limitations had run. 8
In refusing to bar plaintiffs' action, the court relied upon the New
Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c) and 17(a). 59 Since New Mexico
courts prefer to further "the interests of justice and to promote the adjudication of a case upon its merits," ' amendments should be freely
granted and permitted to relate back to the original filing of a complaint
whenever the requirements of Rule 15(c) are met. 6 The court further
relied on Rule 17(a) for the proposition that a reasonable time for joinder
or substitution of parties should be permitted when a suit is not commenced by the real party in interest as a result of an honest mistake. 62
The progression of the case through two years of extensive discovery
before the defendants ever questioned the plaintiffs' capacity to sue led
the court to the ultimate conclusion that the amendment should relate
back to the initial complaint, thereby preventing a bar to plaintiffs' action.63 Relation-back could be accomplished under either Rule 15(c) or
17(a), both because the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the same conduct as specified in the original complaint and because
the defendants would not be prejudiced by plaintiffs' appointment as
personal representative.'
Additionally, the New Mexico Supreme Court expressly overruled Mackey
v. Burke.65 The court reasoned that the Court of Appeals in Mackey had
drawn three erroneous conclusions: (1)that the personal representative
requirement is jurisdictional; (2) that if it is not met, the suit is a "nullity";
and (3) that an amendment adding a party as a personal representative
could not relate back to the original complaint if filed after the statute of
limitations had run.' Because the New Mexico Supreme Court saw these
views as unnecessarily restrictive, it overturned the Mackey decision.67
The Chavez court also distinguished the cases upon which the Mackey
court relied to reach its conclusion that the original suit was a nullity.'
58. Id. (citing the Henkel decision for the proposition that
incapacity to sue does not bar the
action).
59. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(c) and 17(a).
60. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 610, 711 P.2d at 887.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 611-12, 711 P.2d at888-89.
64. Id.
65. Id.at 608, 711 P.2d at 885.
66. Id.at 609, 711 P.2d at 886.
67. Id.
68. Id.at 610, 711 P.2d at 887. The Chavez court indicated that in DeVargas v. State ex rel.
New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d 1327 (Ct. App. 1981), cert. quashed,
97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982), the original complaint was a nullity because it failed to state
a claim for relief under the Civil Rights Act. Mercer v. Morgan, 86 N.M. 711, 526 P.2d 1304 (Ct.
App. 1974), was distinguished because the suit was filed against a defendant who was deceased at
the time of filing the compaint and, therefore, the original pleading was a nullity.
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B. Analysis of the Chavez Decision
The New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that plaintiffs' lack of capacity
to sue within the limitations period, although otherwise properly brought,
would not bar their wrongful death action.69 The court held that relationback of plaintiffs' amended complaint should be permitted when all that
is missing is the representative status of the plaintiffs within the statutory
period.7 ° Furthermore, the court's reliance on precedent from other jurisdictions served to position New Mexico among the ranks of the majority
of United States jurisdictions. 7'
Rules 15(c) and 17(a) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure
provided the basis for the court's solution to the problem caused by the
plaintiffs' failure to secure court-appointment of a personal representative
within the statute of limitations .72 New Mexico has patterned its Rules
of Civil Procedure after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 73 It is wellestablished at both the state and federal levels that pleadings are not an
end in themselves, but are only a means to the proper presentation of a
case. 74 In light of this general goal, Rule 15(c) and the Chavez decision
recognize that pleadings should not be over-emphasized. 7
Rule 15(c) governs the relation back of amendments.76 It provides that
69. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 612, 711 P.2d at 889.
70. Id. at 610, 711 P.2d at 887.
7 1. The majority view authorizes plaintiffs who bring wrongful death actions individually, rather
than in a representative capacity, to allege due appointment as a representative through an amendment,
notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Longbottom v. Swaby, 397
F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968); Crowder v. Gordons Trans. Inc., 387 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1967); Holmes v.
Pennsylvania New York Central Trans. Co., 48 F.R.D. 449 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Shinkle v. Union
City Body Co., 94 F.R.D. 631 (D. Kan. 1982); Brohan v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp. of America, 97
F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Frankel v. Styer, 209 F. Supp. 509 (D.C. Pa. 1962); Fierstein v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 79 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Pa. 1948); Bermudez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 433
So.2d 565 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So.2d 416 (1984); Pavlov v. Konwall, 113 Ill.
App. 3d 576, 447 N.E.2d 982 (1983); Modem Bakery, Inc. v. Brashear, 405 S.W.2d 742 (Ky.
1966); Burcl v. North Carolina Baptist Hospital, Inc., 306 N.C. 214, 293 S.E.2d 85 (1982); Kyes
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 158 Ohio St. 362, 109 N.E.2d 503 (1952). See also Annot., 12 A.L.R.
FED 233 (1972); Annot., 27 A.L.R.4TH 198 (1984); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3D 1234 (1965).
72. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 609, 711 P.2d at 886.
73. Id. 103 N.M. at 611, 711 P.2d at 888. See also Malone v. Swift Fresh Meats Co., 91 N.M.
359, 362, 574 P.2d 283, 286 (1978).
74. 3 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.02[1] (2nd ed. 1985). See, e.g., Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game
of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle
that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.") (as cited in Hambaugh
v. Peoples, 75 N.M. 144, 153, 401 P.2d 777, 782 (1965); United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S.
310 (1960); Seasons, Inc. v. Atwell, 86 N.M. 751, 753, 527 P.2d 792, 794 (1974)(The purpose of
pleadings is to give the parties "fair notice" of both claims and defenses and the grounds upon
which they rest).
75. According to Moore, Rule 15 has three purposes: (1) it facilitates amendments; (2) it adopts
the relation-back doctrine; and (3) it recognizes that pleadings should not be over-emphasized at the
trial stage. MOORE, supra note 74, at §§ 15.02[t].
76. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(c); FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c). Rule 15(c) reads as follows:
(c) Relation back of amendments.
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the
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a claim asserted in an amended pleading relates back to the date of the
original pleading if it arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence
set forth in the original pleading.77 In other words, Rule 15(c) seeks a
common core of operative facts in the original and amended pleading.7"
However, since the purpose of the relation-back doctrine is to ameliorate
the effect of the statute of limitations, the standard for determining whether
amendments qualify under Rule 15(c) is not simply an identity of transaction test.79 In addition, the defendant must have received adequate notice
within the limitations period of the claim against him, so that he will not
be unfairly prejudiced if the amendment was permitted to relate back.8 °
Although Rule 15(c) is considered a device for changing parties, the
rule, as phrased, seems to deal only with changing defendants. At first
glance, it would appear inapplicable to changing the capacity of a plaintiff
to bring an action. However, the Advisory Committee Note indicates that
the approach adopted in Rule 15(c) towards amendments affecting defendants extends by analogy to changing plaintiffs. 8' In fact, the Advisory
Committee suggests that the problem of relation back is generally easier
to resolve in the context of changing plaintiffs than when it is presented
by a change in defendants. 82 This suggestion is based upon the fact that
sufficient identity of interest between the original and new plaintiff can
be shown more easily than when defendants are being changed, and there
is less likely to be prejudice to the defendant when the only amendment
is plaintiff's capacity to sue.83
The Chavez court's justification for the result it reached was technically
sound. Through its emphasis on Rule 15(c), a rule used primarily to
change defendants, the court implied that it is also acceptable to use 15(c)
conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back
if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for
commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits; and (2) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him.
77. Id.
78. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, at § 1497 (1971).
79. Id.
80. N.M. R. Civ. P. 15(c); FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c); 3 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 15.15; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, at § 1497.

81. 39 F.R.D. 82-84 (1966). Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c).
The note indicated that as with changing defendants, the chief consideration of policy is the statute
of limitations.
82. 39 F.R.D. at 83; WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, § 1501 at 523-24.
83. MOORE, supra note 74, at § 15.15[4.-21. The defendant should thus not be permitted to invoke
a limitations defense as long as the scope of the amended pleading remains within the "ambit" of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original pleading. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 10, § 1501 at 524.
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to change plaintiffs.' In the present case, there was little doubt that the
plaintiffs' claim against the defendants in their amended complaint was
identical to the cause of action alleged in the original complaint. All that
was altered was plaintiffs' capacity to sue. Thus, the defendants clearly
had notice of the claim against them within the statutory period, and they
would not be prejudiced by the appointment of the plaintiff as personal
representative after the running of the statute of limitations. Therefore,
the Chavez court followed the procedural approach that avoided forfeiture
and properly allowed plantiffs' amended complaint to relate back to the
original filing of the complaint.
Although no technical error resulted from the court's application of
Rule 15(c), a more efficient means of curing a plaintiff's lack of capacity
to sue is through a utilization of Rule 17(a), which concerns the "real
party in interest. "8 The real party in interest is the party who, by substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced.86 Thus, a party authorized
by statute to maintain an action is a real party in interest. In addition to
the requirement that the party must be the owner of the right sought to
be enforced, New Mexico requires that the plaintiff must be in a position
to discharge the defendant from the liability being asserted in the suit.87
Because of the liberal application of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a
claim that is not prosecuted by the real party in interest may usually be
amended if the error results from an honest mistake. 8 Rule 17(a) stipulates
that the court "may allow a reasonable time for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party
in interest .. "89 This final sentence in Rule 17(a) was designed to
avoid forfeiture and injustice when an understandable mistake was made
84. Chavez, 103 N.M. at 610, 711 P.2d at 887.
85. N.M. R. Civ. P. 17(a) provides:
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest; but an executor, administrator, guardian, trustee of an express
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the
benefit of another or a party authorized by statute may sue in his own name
without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and
when a statute of the state so provides, an action for the use of benefit of another
shall be brought in the name of the state. Where it appears that an action, by
reason of honest mistake, is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest,
the court may allow a reasonable time for ratification of commencement of the
action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had
been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.
86. MOORE, supra note 74, § 17.07 at 17-65.
87. L. R. Property Management v. Grebe, 96 N.M. 22, 23, 627 P.2d 864, 865 (1981); Jesko v.
Stauffer Chemical Co., 89 N.M. 786, 790, 558 P.2d 55, 59 (Ct. App. 1976); Reagan v. Dougherty,
40 N.M. 439, 62 P.2d 810 (1936).
88. N.M. R. Ctv. P. 17(a).
89. Id.
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in selecting the party in whose name the action should be brought."
Consequently, a correction of the parties is permitted even after the statute
of limitations has run. 9 Like Rule 15(c), Rule 17(a) reflects the general
policy of the rules of civil procedure: an error in choosing a party at the
pleading stage should not be the basis for dismissal of the action.
The Chavez decision could have avoided any resort to Rule 15(c) by
relying entirely upon Rule 17(a).92 In a wrongful death action, Rule 17(a)
and the Wrongful Death Act require that a personal representative file the
complaint. 93 Rule 17(a) permits "ratification of commencement of the
action" within a reasonable time.94 Therefore, the court in Chavez could
have cured the defect in plaintiffs' original complaint, which was amended
two months after the running of the limitations period, 95 by complete
reliance on Rule 17(a).
In addition to its solution to the statute of limitations problem, the
Chavez court discussed the earlier New Mexico case of DeVargas v. State
ex rel. New Mexico Departmentof Corrections' with some disapproval."
Chavez distinguished DeVargas on its facts.9" In DeVargas, the original
complaint failed to state a claim for relief under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act." The court held that any attempt to amend the complaint
after the statute of limitations had run would fail since the original complaint was a nullity. " The Chavez court attempted to reduce the harshness
that the complaint
of such a result by stating, somewhat unpersuasively,
°
in the present case was "valid on its face.''
While most courts agree that the original complaint is still valid when
90. 39 F.R.D. 85. The Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 amendment to Rule 17(a) indicated
that the provision was included simply to promote justice. Now that "justice has been accomplished,"
the modem function of the rule is simply to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by
the party actually entitled to recover and to insure that the judgment will have its proper effect as
res judicata. Id.
91. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 10, at § 1555.
92. Id. at § 1501. See Longbottom v. Swaby, 397 F.2d 45 (5th Cir. 1968) (Eliminating the
applicability of Rule 15(c) when all that the amendment sought was to change plaintiff's capacity
to sue); Brohan v. Volkswagen Mfg. Corp. of America, 97 F.R.D. 46 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (Correcting
plaintiff's capacity to sue after the statute of limitations had run was the type of technical mistake
contemplated by Rule 17(a)).
93. N.M. STAT. ANN. §41-2-3.
94. N.M. R. Ctv. P. 17(a).
95. 103 N.M. at 607, 711 P.2d at 884.
96. 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d 1327 (1981).
97. 103 N.M. at 610, 711 P.2d at 887.
98. Id.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
100. DeVargas, 97 N.M. at 452, 640 P.2d at 1329.
101. 103 N.M. at 610, 711 P.2d at 887. The court explained that the complaint's "only defect
is that the plaintiffs failed to secure appointment as personal representatives within the statutory
period." Id.
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capacity to sue is questioned, a party must also have the capacity to sue
in order to commence and maintain an action.' 02 The distinction between
the two views lies in the interpretation given to the statute of limitations
period in a wrongful death statute. The minority position, as evidenced
in Mackey v. Burke, 03 views the appointment of a personal representative
as a condition precedent or a jurisdictional necessity to maintain the
action; the majority perceives the appointment of a personal representative as a requirement that is amenable to changes and liberal granting
of amendments in order to ensure that the action is prosecuted by the real
party in interest." In light of the possibility of harsh results continuing
to occur in New Mexico under the minority view, the Supreme Court in
Chavez favored justice over strict statutory and procedural requirements,
and adopted the majority view as it applied to wrongful death actions.
The rationale of Chavez also served to undercut the basis of the opinion
in DeVargas, which did not allow an amendment of a Section 1983 action.
In light of the court's shift towards "justice" through the liberal granting
of amendments, the failure in the future to allege a cause of action under
Section 1983 within the statute of limitations period may not be fatal to
the action. DeVargas may thus be overturned by relying on the Chavez
rationale.
C. Ramifications of the Chavez Decision
The Chavez decision makes clear that the legislative mandate must be
followed; wrongful death actions must be pursued by a personal representative, regardless of the court's depiction of a personal representative
as a nominal party. 1"6 Future wrongful death litigants should heed the
New Mexico Supreme Court's directive and obtain court-appointment of
a personal representative within the statute of limitations, rather than rely
on the Chavez court rationale to save them. Chavez may well be limited
to its specific facts. Thus, in future cases where the natural persons to
sue do not bring the action, where they fail to correct their error on their
own initiative shortly after the statute of limitations has run, or where
"sand-bagging" (the defendants' failure to bring plaintiffs' lack of capacity
to the attention of the court until several years after the action commences)
exists, a New Mexico court may reject arguments for a relation-back
based on furthering the ends of justice and pursuing the goals of the rules
of civil procedure.
102. Pearson v. Anthony, 218 Iowa 697, 254 N.W. 10 (1934).
103. 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359.
104. See, e.g., Mackey v. Burke, 102 N.M. 294,694 P.2d 1359 (Ct. App. 1984); General Motors
Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
105. Chavez, 103 N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883.
106. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Chavez returned New Mexico to the mainstream
position previously rejected by the court of appeals in Mackey v. Burke. 07
'
Through its reliance on the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure 15(c)
and 17(a), the court prevented a dismissal of plaintiffs' action for wrongful
death that would have resulted from the lack of capacity to sue as personal
representative within the statute of limitations. A practitioner confronted
with a wrongful death action in the future would do well to obtain courtappointment of a personal representative within the statute of limitations,
because the Chavez decision may not apply when facts, controlling in
this case, are not present in another.
NICKAY BOUCHARD

107. Id.; Mackey, 102 N.M. 294, 694 P.2d 1359.

